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Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
in Regional Trade Agreements: Canada-
U.S. FTA, NAFTA and Beyond*
Gilbert R. Winham**
Heather A. Grant***
The use of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties
(CVDs) to prevent or remedy unfair trade practices has been an
important issue during recent multilateral and regional trade
negotiations. It is a particularly difficult issue because parties
differ on the role unfair trade remedies should play in trade pol-
icy. One approach is to view these measures as an attempt to
remedy or offset unfair trade practices by foreign governments
or exporters. Alternatively, exporters may view these measures
as politically motivated contingency protection, or as "measures
of 'stand-by protection' or techniques of administered trade."'
Unfair trade remedies are provided on the initiative of specific
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but accept responsibility for any errors remaining in the text.
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industries on the basis of a complicated body of trade regula-
tions. The system is discrete and highly legalistic, and is an al-
ternative to a more general approach to trade policy based on
multilateral tariff reductions or codes of conduct.
Because parties differ on the role unfair trade remedies
should play in trade policy, these remedies have been applied
unevenly among the Contracting Parties (CPs) to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 The result is an "une-
ven playing field" among trading partners, 3 and it has become
evident that more standardized rules and procedures governing
the application of these remedies are required. A considerable
step in the direction of greater standardization has been
achieved in the Antidumping and Subsidies Codes negotiated in
the Uruguay Round. Elsewhere, other measures have been con-
sidered in regional agreements to achieve the desired security of
access to a trading partner's market in order to foster economic
growth in a competitive environment.
The application of AD and CVDs by the United States was
one of the major Canadian grievances that surfaced during the
negotiation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA).4
Initially, Canada tried unsuccessfully to gain a blanket exemp-
tion from U.S. trade remedy laws. As an alternative, Canada
placed considerable emphasis on negotiating a dispute settle-
ment mechanism into the FTA that would reduce Canada's ex-
posure to the use of AD and CVDs by the United States.
The dispute settlement mechanism ultimately incorporated
into Chapter 19 of the FTA provides for judicial-like review of
AD and CVD actions by binational panels. 5 More specifically, it
provides exporters and importers the option of taking a disputed
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A-S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
3. J. Michael Finger, Antidumping and Antisubsidy Measures, in THE
URUGUAY RoUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MuLTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
153, 155 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
4. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, 27 I.L.M.
281 [hereinafter FTA]. For a discussion of Canadian grievances regarding the
application of AD and CVDs by the United States, see GILBERT R. WiNIAM,
TRADING WITH CANADA: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 38 (1988).
5. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(2). Article 1904(2) states, in pertinent
part:
Either Party may request that a panel review, based upon the adminis-
trative record, a final antidumping or countervailing duty determina-
tion of a competent investigating authority of either Party to
determine whether such determination was in accordance with the an-
tidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party.
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AD or CVD action to a binational panel with binding powers in
lieu of seeking judicial review by a domestic court.6 Because in-
dividuals from both the United States and Canada sit on the
panels, it is generally assumed that binational panels promote
greater consistency and objectivity in AD and CVD practices.
Although the panels are not authorized to create substantive
law, the review mechanism helps to ensure that each nation is
applying its own laws fairly and consistently. Determinations of
dumping and subsidization can be different in each country, but
will be upheld as long as the administrative agency made its de-
termination in accordance with domestic law.7 Owing to these
various characteristics, Chapter 19 has been one of the most
unique dispute settlement mechanisms developed in recent
years.
The success of the FTA Chapter 19 mechanism leads some-
what obviously to its consideration as a model for other trade
agreements. What remains at issue is whether this mechanism
can be applied effectively in a considerably broader context, such
as a hemispheric or multilateral trade agreement, given the dif-
ferences that exist between the legal and administrative prac-
tices of the prospective negotiating parties. The purpose of this
Article is to examine some of the obstacles and implications of
adopting a Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism in other
trade agreements. After examining the operation of Chapter 19
in the FTA, the Article focuses on the incorporation of Chapter
19 into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 8
The extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico in NAFTA raised some of
the problems that may later be encountered either in extending
NAFTA to new parties or in establishing a Chapter 19-type
mechanism in other trade agreements.
To appreciate the significance of a Chapter 19 mechanism,
it is first necessary to look at the historical development of AD
and CVD actions in international trade. The intent of this re-
view is twofold. First, it serves to set out the basic tenets under-
lying the creation of these measures to remedy unfair trade
practices. Second, it illustrates the impact that the use of unfair
trade remedies by the United States had on Canada, and indi-
cates why Canada initially sought a binding dispute settlement
mechanism on AD and CVDs.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-
Canada (Draft of Sept. 6, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF AD AND CVDs
A. AD AND CVDs UNDER THE GATT
One of the primary objectives of the GATT is to promote se-
cure access to foreign markets so that businesses will feel confi-
dent that they can export their products to other countries
without encountering any unfair or unforeseen impediments in
competing for a portion of the consumer market.9 Dumping and
unrestricted subsidization have long been recognized as serious
obstacles to this objective. Dumping is generally understood as
the sale of goods on a foreign market at a price which is less
than that at which the product is sold on the seller's domestic
market. A subsidy is the granting of a non-commercial benefit,
usually by the government, at any stage of a good's manufac-
ture, production or export.
A general concern about the harmful effects of dumping and
subsidization resulted in their inclusion in the GATT negotia-
tions in 1947. These negotiations concluded with the insertion
of a remedy under Article VI of the final Agreement, which al-
lows CPs to the GATT to take unilateral action to offset the ef-
fects of dumping or subsidies on their domestic industries
through the use of AD and CVDs. 10
GATT Article VI allows the application of an AD duty
against an imported good where it is being dumped on the for-
eign market and is causing or threatening to cause "material in-
jury to an established industry . . . or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry."1 A CVD may be applied
to an imported good to offset the effects of a foreign subsidy
where the subsidy causes, or threatens to cause, injury to the
domestic industry or the potential development of such
industry. 12
The GATT provisions for AD and CVDs represented mini-
mal commitment to any real control over these practices. Over
time, and with increased use, AD and CVDs were arguably used
9. The preface to the GATr states, in pertinent part, that the Contracting
Parties are:
desirous of... entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous ar-
rangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce....
GATT pmbl.
10. ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A CoMPARATIvE STUDY 6 (John H.
Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
11. GATr art. VI:A.
12. Id. art. VI:6(a).
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less as remedies and more as protectionist devices in them-
selves. This realization paved the way for the creation of the
Antidumping and Subsidies Codes during the Kennedy Round
in 1967 and the Tokyo Round in 1979. The purpose of these
Codes was to define more precisely the conduct expected of CPs
in their investigation and assessment of dumping and subsidy
practices so that unfair usage would not jeopardize the free flow
of goods.
The first Antidumping Code, concluded in 1967, was re-
placed in 1979 by a new Code, 13 which sets out more explicit
requirements governing a country's conduct of its antidumping
and injury investigations, and the application of duties or price
undertakings. The Tokyo Round Code has been largely success-
ful in achieving a greater standardization of antidumping prac-
tices among CPs. 4
In contrast, the Subsidies Code,' 5 negotiated during the To-
kyo Round, has not been as useful in standardizing world prac-
tice. Like the Antidumping Code; the Subsidies Code imposes
some greater procedural requirements upon signatories with re-
spect to employing subsidies and assessing CVDs. However, be-
cause of differing views among trading nations on the legitimacy
of subsidies in domestic economies, and hence a lack of coopera-
tive support, the Subsidies Code is essentially weak interna-
tional law. Moreover, prior to the Uruguay Round, the
Subsidies Code was not incorporated into the GATT, although
signatories were obliged to implement its provisions into their
domestic laws.
While dumping is generally considered an unfair practice,
not all forms of subsidies are necessarily considered unfair.
Thus, not all subsidies are countervailable. As recognized in the
preamble to the Subsidies Code, subsidies have a dual nature:
they can be instrumental in promoting important domestic pol-
icy objectives, while at the same time possibly harming a foreign
industry's competitiveness.16 The Code's objective in defining
13. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919 reprinted in BISD 26th
Supp. 171 (1979).
14. Finger, supra note 3, at 156.
15. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T.
513 reprinted in BISD 26th Supp. 56 (1979).
16. Id. The preamble states, in pertinent part:
Recognizing that subsidies are used by governments to promote
important objectives of national policy,
1994]
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when and how a subsidy may be countervailed is to balance the
harm of a subsidy against the injurious effects of a CVD.
Among CPs, there is considerable disparity in the applica-
tion of subsidies and CVDs. 17 The United States is by far the
most important country on this matter. The U.S. government
strongly opposes the use of subsidies. In an effort to protect U.S.
producers from competition with subsidized imports, the United
States has been the most frequent user of the CVD mecha-'
nism.i s As a result, subsidies and CVDs are important trade
issues for nations that have extensive trade with the United
States.
B. U.S. POLICY ON AD AND CVDs
The United States is a signatory to both Tokyo Round Codes
and has incorporated the provisions of the Antidumping Code
and the Subsidies Code into U.S. law through the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 197919 (TAA). However, the TAA also contained
provisions which made it easier to bring AD and CVD actions.
The TAA restructured the U.S. unfair trade remedy system
in a politically significant manner. From 1954 until the enact-
ment of the TAA, bureaucratic responsibility for the trade rem-
edy system had been divided between the Treasury Department,
which made determinations of dumping or subsidy, and the In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC), which handled determina-
tions of injury. In 1979, responsibility for the former was shifted
to the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce. Because that department was perceived as being
more sympathetic to domestic producers than the Treasury De-
partment had been, this change was widely regarded as a move
to facilitate the use of trade remedies by U.S. constituents. 2
0
Recognizing also that subsidies may have harmful effects on trade
and production,
Recognizing that the emphasis of this Agreement should be on the
effects of subsidies and that these effects are to be assessed in giving
due account to the internal economic situation of the signatories con-
cerned as well as to the state of international economic and monetary
relations...
Id.
17. J. Michael Finger & Julio Nogus, International Control of Subsidies
and Countervailing Duties, 1 WoRLD BANK ECON. REv. 707, 712 (1989).
18. Between 1980 and mid-1986, the United States initiated 281 CVD ac-
tions. THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, Annex 8.
19. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 93-39, § 1(a), July 26, 1979,
93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (1988)) [hereinaf-
ter TAA].
20. GREY, supra note 1, at 56.
[Vol. 3:1
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The main impact of the TAA on CVDs was to incorporate
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code into U.S. legislation. 21 The
major change was to introduce a material injury requirement
into U.S. CVD practice. The obligation to demonstrate injury on
products coming from Subsidies Code signatories was an impor-
tant change in U.S. law. However, it appears that the require-
ment of "material" injury has not been significant in practice. 22
Greater transparency in the rules and regulations, as well
as new procedural requirements incorporated into the TAA,
made it easier for domestic producers in the United States to
petition for AD or CVD actions, and to seek review of those ac-
tions through the judicial system.23 This has produced a sharp
increase in the number of actions launched by the United States
21. Prior to the TAA, the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. I,
§§ 402, 407, 409, Jan. 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2487 (1988)), had expanded CVD procedures in U.S. law, especially re-
garding judicial review. The Act provided for a right to request judicial review
by a Customs Court, which later became the Court of International Trade
(CIT). Manufacturers and producers in the United States were given standing
to make such a request. Previously, only importers had that right. Addition-
ally, parties were given the right to have judicial review of negative findings
and to challenge the amount of a CVD finding in addition to the finding itself.
The Trade Act of 1974 both facilitated the use of CVDs and improved the
procedural safeguards associated with those procedures. For example, writing
about the pre-1974 period, Stanley Metzger noted,
[olne of the most striking aspects of countervailing duty administra-
tion in the United States is the almost total lack of procedural safe-
guards in official proceedings. Neither statute, nor regulations make
any provision for hearings and the usual ancillary procedures accord-
ing substantial elements of procedural due process to parties or coun-
tries affected by a countervailing duty imposition. The lack of
procedural safeguards is peculiarly disturbing in view of the very great
discretion delegated to the secretary of the treasury and, through him,
to the Bureau of Customs.
STANLEY D. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARRmRs: U.S. LAw, PRACTICE AND
NEGOTIATING OBJECrVEs 105 (1979).
22. Material injury was defined in the TAA as "harm which is not inconse-
quential, immaterial or unimportant." TAA § 771(7XA), 93 Stat. at 178 (current
version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(a) (1988)). Washington trade lawyer Matthew
Marks has observed: "I can only conclude.., that the substitution of a material
injury standard for the prior standard of simple injury under the Trade Act of
1974 has had little, if any, effect on the Commission's administration of the
Anti-dumping Act and countervailing duty law to date." GREY, supra note 1, at
46 (citing the text of letter of 31 July 1980 of Matthew Marks to Rodney Grey).
23. See Matthew J. Marks, Recent Changes in American Law on Regulatory
Trade Measures, 2 WORLD ECON. 427 (1980). Among the changes to CVD proce-
dures noted by Marks are shortened time periods for the agency to reach deci-
sions, and provision for the use of "best information available," which, as Marks
notes, "traditionally, has been a euphemism for the allegations supplied in the
petition." Id. at 432. Marks states, "Given the strong Congressional criticism of
the Treasury Department's recent administration of the unfair-trade laws ... it
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since the passage of the TAA in 1979 (and the Trade Act of
1974). Prior to 1974, the United States only occasionally re-
sorted to AD or CVD actions. Between 1934 and 1974, approxi-
mately forty-one CVD orders were issued, roughly one a year.24
In contrast, the United States initiated 281 CVD investigations
from 1980 to 1986.25 The United States initiated eleven new
CVD actions against Canada alone from 1980 to 1986.26
The use of trade remedies increased worldwide in the 1980s,
but whereas the use of AD duties is fairly evenly distributed
among trading nations, CVDs are principally a U.S. policy in-
strument.27 As aptly described by Patrick Messerlin, "[tlo the
United States, the [Subsidies] [C]ode is an instrument to control
subsidies. To the rest of the world, it is an instrument to control
U.S. countervailing duties."28
II. THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT
In view of the frequent use by the United States of unfair
trade remedies during the 1980s, especially countervailing du-
ties, Canada recognized the need to achieve more secure access
to the U.S. market, given its high dependence on trade with that
country and the likelihood of its increased dependence in the fu-
ture. Security of access, therefore, became one of the major
goals pursued by Canada in the FTA negotiations. During the
negotiations, Canada originally hoped to achieve an exclusion
from the scope of U.S. unfair trade remedy laws. However, the
United States never considered this proposal a serious option.
Canada's alternate suggestion, that a list of "acceptable" and
would seem likely, in situations where all the facts are not available, that
doubts will be resolved in favour of the petitioner." Id. at 433.
24. Michael M. Hart, The Future on the Table: The Continuing Negotiating
Agenda under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, in Lr-n.iG WITH
FREE TRADE: CANADA, THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE GATT 67, 97
(Richard G. Dearden et al. eds, 1989).
25. THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 259.
26. Id. at 260.
27. Between 1980 and 1986, AD actions initiated by three GAIT CPs were
as follows: United States 350; EC 280; and Canada 230. Id. at 265. CVD ac-
tions initiated over the same period were: United States 281; EC 7; and Canada
11. Id. at 262.
28. Finger, supra note 3, at 156 (quoting Patrick Messerlin, Public Subsi-
dies to Industry and Agriculture and Countervailing Duties (paper prepared for
the European Meeting on the Position of the European Community in the New
GATT Round October 2-4, 1986)).
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"unacceptable" subsidies be established by the parties, similarly
came to an impasse.
Canada's lack of success in negotiating the inclusion of
either of these proposals into the FTA led it to accept an interim
dispute settlement mechanism based on binational panel review
of AD and CVD actions. 29 Canada believed that this mechanism
would provide some indirect control over the use of U.S. trade
remedy laws against Canadian goods. For Canada, the mecha-
nism was fundamental to closing a deal. Had the proposal been
rejected by the United States, Canada would not have signed the
Agreement. Only hours before the deadline, the United States
agreed to a binding dispute settlement mechanism covering AD
and CVDs.
Dispute settlement on AD and CVDs is included in Chapter
19 of the FTA. The Chapter contains three parts. First, the par-
ties agreed to continue negotiating on dumping and subsidy is-
sues, and to establish alternative rules in seven years if
possible.30 Although the parties created a Working Group to
pursue this task,31 both countries agreed to negotiate issues of
29. The idea for binational review was first proposed by Representative
Sam Gibbons, chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. It was enthusiastically ac-
cepted by the Senate Finance Committee which had strongly opposed any at-
tempt to grant exceptions for Canada from U.S. trade remedy laws. See
WINHAM, supra note 4, at 42.
30. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1906. Article 1906 states:
The provisions of this Chapter shall be in effect for five years pending
the development of a substitute system of rules in both countries for
antidumping and countervailing duties as applied to their bilateral
trade. If no such system of rules is agreed and implemented at the end
of five years, the provisions of this Chapter shall be extended for a fur-
ther two years. Failure to agree to implement a new regime at the end
of the two-year extension shall allow either Party to terminate the
Agreement on a six-month notice.
Id.
31. Id. art. 1907. Article 1907 states:
1. The Parties shall establish a Working Group that shall:
a) seek to develop more effective rules and disciplines concerning
the use of government subsidies;
b) seek to develop a substitute system of rules for dealing with
unfair pricing and government subsidies; and
c) consider any problems that may arise with respect to the imple-
mentation of this Chapter and recommend solutions, where
appropriate.
2. The Working Group shall report to the Parties as soon as possible.
The Parties shall use their best efforts to develop and implement
the substitute system of rules within the time limits established in
Article 1906.
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dumping and subsidy/countervailing duties in the multilateral
Uruguay Round in lieu of bilateral talks.
Second, the parties agreed that amendments to either coun-
try's AD or CVD laws would be subject to constraints of notifica-
tion and consultation, and that such amendments would be
consistent with relevant provisions of the GATT, other multilat-
eral accords and the FTA itself.32 Additionally, the parties
agreed to submit proposed legislative changes to a binational
panel for an advisory opinion on the consistency of the changes
with existing obligations under international law.33
Third, the parties established binational panels to replace
judicial review by domestic courts of final AD or CVD determi-
32. Id. art. 1902(2). Article 1902(2) states:
Each Party reserves the right to change or modify its antidumping law
or countervailing duty law, provided that in the case of an amendment
to a Party's antidumping or countervailing duty statute:
a) such amendment shall apply to goods from the other Party only
if such application is specified in the amending statute;
b) the amending Party notifies the other Party in writing of the
amending statute as far in advance as possible of the date of enact-
ment of such statute;
c) following notification, the amending Party, upon request of the
other Party, consults with the other Party prior to the enactment
of the amending statute; and
d) such amendment, as applicable to the other Party, is not incon-
sistent with:
i) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Antidumping Code), or
the Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Arti-
cles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (the Subsidies Code), or
ii) the object and purpose of this Agreement and this Chapter,
which is to establish fair and predictable conditions for the
progressive liberalizing of trade between the two countries
while maintaining effective disciplines on unfair trade prac-
tices, such object and purpose to be ascertained from the pro-
visions of this Agreement, its preamble and objectives, and the
practices of the Parties.
Id.
33. Id. art. 1903(1). Article 1903(1) states that:
A Party may request in writing that an amendment to the other
Party's antidumping statute or countervailing duty statute be referred
to a panel for a declaratory opinion as to whether:
a) the amendment does not conform to the provisions of subpara-
graph (d)(i) or (d)(ii) of paragraph 2 of Article 1902; or
b) such amendment has the function and effect of overturning a
prior decision of a panel made pursuant to Article 1904 and does
not conform to the provisions of subparagraph (d)(i) or (d)(ii) of
paragraph 2 of Article 1902. Such declaratory opinion shall have
force or effect only as provided in this Article.
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nations by national agencies.3 4 Each party agreed to retain its
own AD and CVD practices 35 - which were fairly similar in any
case - and to make available binational panels to persons who
would otherwise have been entitled to judicial review under do-
mestic law.36 The panel's mandate is to consider the adminis-
trative record of the case challenged and decide generally
whether the final determination has been made in accordance
with the applicable domestic law.37
Panels are composed of five members chosen from a roster
of trade experts, primarily lawyers, established in each coun-
try.38 Two panelists are selected by each country while the fifth
member is chosen jointly, or, where there is no agreement on the
final member, by lot.39 In practice, the fifth member's national-
ity has alternated between the two countries from one panel to
the next.
The standard of review to be applied by the panel is the
standard applicable in the country where the AD or CVD action
was taken.40 In Canada, the test is whether the agency: (a)
34. Id. art. 1904.
35. Id. art. 1902(1). Article 1902(1) states that:
Each Party reserves the right to apply its antidumping law and coun-
tervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of the other
Party. Antidumping law and countervailing duty law include, as ap-
propriate for each Party, relevant statutes, legislative history, regula-
tions, administrative practice, and judicial precedents.
Id.
36. Id. art. 1904(2). Article 1904(2) states, in pertinent part:
Either Party may request that a panel review, based upon the adminis-
trative record, a final antidumping or countervailing duty determina-
tion of a competent investigating authority of either Party to
determine whether such determination was in accordance with the an-
tidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party....
Id. (emphasis added). Subsection (3) adds that: "[tihe Panel shall apply ... the
general legal principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would
apply to a review of a determination of the competent investigating authority."
Id. art. 1904(3).
37. Id. art. 1904(2).
38. FTA, supra note 4, Annex 1901.2.
39. Id.
40. Id. art. 1904(3). Article 1904(3) of the FTA states that, "[tihe Panel
shall apply the standard of review described in Article 1911 and the general
legal principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply to a
review of a determination of the competent investigating authority." Id. Article
1911 of the FTA defines the standard of review:
standard of review means the following standards, as may be amended
from time to time by a Party:
a) in the case of Canada, the grounds set forth in section 28(1) of
the Federal Court Act with respect to all final determinations; and
b) in the case of the United States of America,
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failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted
beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) erred in law in
making its decision or order, whether or not the error appears on
the face of the record; or (c) based its decision or order on an
erroneous finding of fact that was made in a perverse or capri-
cious manner or without regard to the material before it.4 1 In
the United States, the test is whether the agency's decision is
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or is other-
wise not in accordance with domestic law.42
It is important to note that the panels are not authorized to
create substantive law. Rather, their determinations must be
consistent with the laws of the importing country.48 Conse-
i) the standard set forth in section 516A(b)(1XB) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, with the exception of a determina-
tion referred to in (ii), and
ii) the standard set forth in section 516A(b)(1)(A) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended, with respect to a determination by
the United States International Trade Commission not to ini-
tiate a review pursuant to section 751(b) of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended.
Id. art. 1911.
41. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 28.1 (1985) (Can.). Under NAFTA,
the applicable standard of review is amended and adopted from section 18.1(4)
of the Federal Court Act, which applies the following test,
[whether the agency]:
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or
refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural
fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to
observe;
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not
the error appears on the face of the record;
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that
it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard
for the material before it;
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or pejured evidence;
or
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.
Federal Court Act, S.C., ch. F-7 (1985), amended by ch. 8, 1990 S.C. (Can.).
42. The standard of review applicable in the United States is adopted from
section 516A(bXl) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat.
687 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988)). See generally
Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, The Functioning of FTA Dispute Resolu-
tion Panels, in NEGOTAnING AND IMPLEMENTING A NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEmENT 1 (Leonard Waverman ed., 1992); Stewart Abercrombie
Baker, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law, in KR. SmMOINns & D.J.
MUSCH, NORTH AMERcAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: DisPuTE SETrLEMENT
(forthcoming, Oceana Publications 1994).
43. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(2). Article 1904(2) states that: "[e]ither
Party may request that a panel review... a final antidumping or counter-
vailing duty determination ... in accordance with the antidumping or counter-
vailing duty law of the importing Party." Id. (emphasis added).
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quently, determinations of dumping and subsidization can be ar-
rived at differently in each country, but the specific
determination will be upheld as long as it was made in accord-
ance with domestic law.
Review of a panel's decision is very limited. There is no ap-
peal mechanism in the FTA to challenge a panel's findings on
the grounds of legal or factual error. However, provision is
made for extraordinary challenges. This provision is invoked
only where: (1) there are allegations of gross misconduct, bias,
serious conflict of interest or other material violation of the rules
of conduct by a panelist, or there is a serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure by the panel, or if the action by
the panel is manifestly in excess of its powers, authority or juris-
diction; and (2) any of the actions outlined above materially af-
fected the panel's decision or threatened the integrity of the
review process. 44
Through October 1993, the parties had initiated forty-four
Chapter 19 cases and two "extraordinary challenges."45 Of
these cases, twenty-eight were directed against U.S. agencies
(i.e., the Department of Commerce (DOC) or the International
Trade Commission (ITC)).46 Eighteen of these cases have been
44. Id. art. 1904(13). Article 1904(13) sets forth the circumstances in
which the extraordinary challenge procedure may be used. FTA Annex 1904.13
details the procedure to be followed in an extraordinary challenge. Id. Annex
1904.13.
45. U.S.-CAN. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BINATIONAL SECRETARIAT, U.S. SEC-
TION, FTA DIsPUTE SE'rrLEMENT (CHAPTERs 18 & 19) STATUS REPORT FOR OCTO-
BER 1993 (1993) [hereinafter FTA STATUS REPORT]. The two cases that were
reviewed by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee were: Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Pork from Canada ECC-91-1904-01 USA (June 14, 1991) and Live
Swine from Canada ECC-93-1904-01 USA (Apr. 8, 1993). Id.
46. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. The following cases have been ini-
tiated against U.S. agencies: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada
USA-92-1904-01 (active); Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada USA
92-1904-02 (active); Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada USA-92-1904-03
(active); Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada USA-92-1904-04 (active);
Magnesium from Canada USA-92-1904-05/06 (active); Certain Cold-Rolled Car-
bon Steel Flat Products from Canada USA-93-1904-01 (active); Certain Hot
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada USA-93-1904-02 (active); Cer-
tain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada USA-93-
1904-03 (active); Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada USA-
93-1904-04 (active); Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Canada USA-93-1904-05 (active); Red Raspberries from Canada USA-89-
1904-01 (Dec. 15, 1989); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Pav-
ing Equipment from Canada USA-89-1904-02 (Jan. 25, 1990); Replacement
Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-89-
1904-03 (Mar. 7, 1990); Dried, Heavy, Salted Codfish from Canada (termi-
nated); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment
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completed, while ten remain active. 47 Sixteen cases have been
initiated against Canadian agencies (i.e., Revenue Canada (RC)
or the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT)).4 8 Five of
these cases have been completed, while eleven remain active.
Two of the sixteen cases against Canadian agencies were
launched by a Canadian petitioner, thirteen were launched by
U.S. petitioners, and the remaining case was launched by a U.S.
from Canada USA-89-1904-05 (terminated); Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork
from Canada USA-89-1904-06 (Sept. 28, 1990); New Steel Rail, Except Light
Rail, from Canada USA-89-1904-07 (June 8, 1990); New Steel Rail, Except
Light Rail, from Canada USA-89-1904-08 (Aug. 30, 1990); New Steel Rails from
Canada USA-89-1904-09/10 (Aug. 13, 1990); Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from
Canada USA-89-1904-11 (Jan. 22, 1991); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled
Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-90-1904-01 (May 15, 1992);
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Canada USA-90-1904-02 (terminated); Sheet
Piling from Canada USA-90-1904-03 (terminated); Oil Country Tubular Goods
from Canada USA 91-1904-01 (terminated); Iron Construction Castings from
Canada USA-91-1904-02 (terminated); Live Swine from Canada USA-91-1904-
03 (May 19, 1992); Live Swine from Canada USA-91-1904-04 (Aug. 26, 1992);
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled. Bituminous Paving Equipment from Can-
ada USA-91-1904-05 (terminated). Id.
47. FrA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45.
48. Id. The following cases have been initiated against Canadian agen-
cies: Certain Machine Tufted Carpeting Originating in or Exported from the
United States of America CDA-92-1904-01 (active); Certain Machine Tufted
Carpeting Originating in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-
92-1904-02 (active); Gypsum Board Originating in or Exported from the United
States of America CDA-93-1904-01 (active); Gypsum Board Originating in or
Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-02 (active); Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and High Strength Low Alloy Plate, Heat-Treated
or not, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-
1904-04 (active); Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet Products Originating in
or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-05 (active); Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and High Strength Low Alloy Plate, Heat-Treated
or not, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-
1904-06 (active); and Certain Flat-Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet Products
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-07
(active); Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet Originating in or Exported from the
United States of America CDA-93-1904-08 (active); Certain Cold-Rolled Steel
Sheet Originating in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-
1904-09 (active); Certain Solder Joint Pipe Fittings Originating in or Exported
from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-10 (active); Polyphase Induc-
tion Motors from the United States CDA-90-1904-01 (Sept. 11, 1991); Certain
Beer Originating in or Exported from the United States of America by G. Heile-
man Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery
Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia CDA-91-
1904-01 (Aug. 6, 1992); Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United
States of America by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Brewing Com-
pany and the Stroh Brewery Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of
British Columbia CDA-91-1904-02 (Feb. 8, 1993); and Tomato Paste in Contain-
ers Larger than 100 Fluid Ounces, Originating in or Exported from the United
States of America CDA-93-1904-03 (terminated). Id.
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producer and several Canadian importers.49 All of the cases
against U.S. agencies were brought by Canadian petitioners,
although in six of these cases U.S. petitioners were also pres-
ent.50 Overall, Canadians have been the major users of Chapter
19 procedures, and the main respondents have been U.S. agen-
cies. However, there has been a sharp rise in the number of
cases initiated against Canadian agencies over the past year, to-
talling ten new cases launched.
The results of Chapter 19 actions are that just less than half
that were reviewed by a panel (and not terminated) resulted in a
remand in whole or in part;51 that is, the determination was re-
turned to the agency for "action not inconsistent with the panel's
decision."5 2 In the five Canadian cases completed, the actions of
the agency were affirmed in one panel and remanded in two
others, while the final two were terminated by the parties., 3 For
the completed U.S. cases, seven were remanded, four were af-
firmed, and seven were terminated.5 4 Excluding terminated
49. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. The two cases launched by Cana-
dian petitioners against negative injury findings by the CITT are: Certain Hot-
Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and High Strength Low Alloy Plate, Heat-Treated or
not, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-
1904-06; and Certain Flat Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet Products Originating
in or Exported from the United States of America CDA-93-1904-07. Id.
50. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. U.S. petitioners were present in
the following six cases: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada USA-
92-1904-01 (May 6, 1993); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous
Paving Equipment from Canada USA-89-1904-02 (Jan. 25, 1990); Replacement
Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-89-
1904-03 (Mar. 7, 1990); Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Pav-
ing Equipment from Canada USA-89-1904-05 (Mar. 7, 1990); New Steel Rails
from Canada USA-89-1904-09/10 (Aug. 13, 1990); and Replacement Parts for
Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-90-1904-01
(May 24, 1990). Id.
51. See FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45.
52. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(8).
53. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. These cases are: Polyphase Induc-
tion Motors from the U.S. CDA-89-1904-01 (terminated); Integral Horsepower
Induction Motors CDA-90-1904-01 (Sept. 11, 1991) (affirmed); Certain Beer
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America by G. Heileman
Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Company and the Stroh Brewery Company for
Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia CDA-91-1904-01 (Aug.
6, 1992) (remanded); Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United
States of America by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Brewing Com-
pany and the Stroh Brewery Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of
British Columbia CDA-91-1904-02 (Feb. 8, 1993) (remanded); and Tomato
Paste in Containers Larger than 100 Fluid Ounces, Originating in or Exported
from the United States of America (terminated). Id.
54. FTA STATUS REPORT, supra note 45. Cases can be remanded in whole
or in part, hence a "remand" may be a relatively insignificant action. The seven
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cases, approximately similar results in the United States were
produced by the Court of International Trade in the period prior
to the FTA.
On balance, the judgment of many jurists is that the Chap-
ter 19 panel process has worked effectively. In a lengthy review
of dispute settlement in the first two years of the FTA, Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld of New York University wrote that: "[a]ll
things considered, the unique binational dispute settlement
mechanisms created by the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement have worked extraordinarily well." 55 In particular,
Lowenfeld notes that the panels have conscientiously applied
the law of the country in which the case arose.56 Panel decisions
have not reflected a bias for or against trade remedy legislation.
Most important, panels have not reflected nationalistic behav-
ior, for panelists usually have dealt objectively with legal issues
and have not attempted to push a Canadian or American ap-
proach to the cases.
Given the success of the FTA Chapter 19 mechanism, it
must be given serious consideration as a means of dealing with
AD and CVDs in other trade agreements. The extension of
Chapter 19 to Mexico in NAFTA provides a useful case study of
how this might be achieved and the problems which might be
encountered.
III. AD AND CVDs UNDER NAFTA
Like Canada in the FTA negotiations, Mexico aimed to
achieve greater and more secure access to the U.S. market by
following U.S. cases were remanded in whole or in part to the U.S. agency: Red
Raspberries from Canada USA-89-1904-01; Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork
from Canada USA-89-1904-06; New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from Canada
USA-89-1904-07; Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada USA-89-1904-11;
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving USA-90-1904-01; Live
Swine from Canada USA-91-1904-03; and Live Swine from Canada USA-91-
1904-04. Id. The four following cases were affirmed: Replacement Parts for
Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada USA-89-1904-02;
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Can-
ada; New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from Canada USA-89-1904-08; and New
Steel Rails from Canada USA-89-1904-09/10. Id.
55. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement under Chapters
18 and'19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Ap-
praisal (paper prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States,
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negotiating a NAFTA with the United States and Canada.5 7 In
recent years, Mexico has increasingly found itself at the receiv-
ing end of U.S. AD actions.58 Between 1980 and 1990, eight AD
actions were initiated by U.S. companies against Mexican pro-
ducers.5 9 In seeking to address the issue of trade remedies in
NAFTA, the parties turned to the Chapter 19 mechanism.
However, even though the dispute settlement mechanism in
Chapter 19 of the FTA has worked well in a bilateral context
between Canada and the United States, it was not necessarily
suitable for NAFTA. There were a variety of obstacles and con-
cerns raised by the possible extension of the FTA's dispute set-
tlement mechanism to Mexico. Before delving into the issues
that were raised by the question of extending a Chapter 19
mechanism to NAFTA, it is useful to briefly consider the nature
of Mexico's unfair trade remedy system as it existed prior to
NAFTA. 60
57. MICHAEL HART, A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA 126-27 (1990).
58. Stephen J. Powell et al., Current Administration of U.S. Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free
Trade Talks, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 177, 179 (1990). Mexico has not encoun-
tered the same problem with U.S. CVD actions as Canada has, because it
signed the "Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties" with the
United States in 1986. Pursuant to its obligations under the Agreement, Mex-
ico substantially altered its subsidy practice. See Celia R. Siac, Does Mexico
Subsidize too Much? Perceptions versus Reality, 36 C.D. HowE INST. COMMEN-
TARY 6 (1992).
59. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. (1980-1989). These include: Car-
bon Steel Wire Rod from Argentina, Mexico, Poland, and Spain, I.T.C. investi-
gations 731-TA-157 through 160 (preliminary) and 701-TA-209 (preliminary)
(1983); Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and
Spain, I.T.C. investigations 701-TA-215 through 217 (preliminary) and 731-TA-
191 through 731-TA-195 (preliminary) (1984); Welded Steel Wire Fabric, for
Concrete Reinforcement from Italy, Mexico, and Venezuela, I.T.C. investigations
701-TA-261(A), 263(A), and 264(A) (preliminary) and 731-TA-289(A) through
291(A) (preliminary) (1986); Porcelain-On-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, the
People's Republic of China, and Taiwan, I.T.C. investigations 701-TA-265 (fi-
nal) and 731-297-299 (final) (1986); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Peru,
Kenya, and Mexico, I.T.C. investigations 303-TA-18 (final) and 731-TA-332 and
333 (final) (1987); Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker from Colum-
bia, France, Greece, Japan, Mexico Republic of Korea, Spain, and Venezuela,
I.T.C. investigation 731-TA-365 through 363 (preliminary)(1986); Certain Steel
Pails from Mexico, I.T.C. investigation 731-TA-435 (preliminary) (1986). Id.
60. As of this writing in December 1993, and as part of the legislative im-
plementation of NAFTA, Mexico is amending its AD and CVD legislation to
conform to its obligations under Chapter 19 of NAFTA, and especially Annex
1904.15 Schedule B.
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A. THE NATuRE OF MEmco's AD AND CVD SYSTEM
Mexico's pre-NAFTA legislation governing AD and CVD ac-
tions consisted of The Foreign Trade Regulatory Act 61 (Act) and
Regulations Against Unfair International Trade Practices62
(Regulations). The agency responsible for AD and CVD actions
under that legislation was the Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento
Industrial (SECOFI), a division of the budget and finance minis-
try, with the Comisi6n de Aranceles y Controles al Comercio Ex-
terior (CACCE) 63 providing consultative support particularly on
the issue of duty assessments.
SECOFI was empowered to conduct up to two investigations
leading to provisional duty assessments and a third culminating
in a final determination.64 In order to make a positive finding,
SECOFI had to determine that an unfair practice (dumping or
subsidization) existed in conjunction with injury to the domestic
industry.65 Mexican importers could appeal final affirmative de-
terminations to SECOFI in order to obtain revocation of the
finding, or appeal further to the Federal Fiscal Tribunal (FFT)
for judicial review.66 In addition, the Mexican Constitution pro-
vided a supplemental remedy known as amparo by which the
constitutionality of the administrative action could be chal-
lenged before the Federal Judicial Courts.67 The significance of
61. Decreto por el que se Crea la Ley Reglamentaria del Artdulo 131 de la
Constituci6n Poltica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en Materia de Corercio
Exterior, D.O., Jan. 13, 1986 [hereinafter Act]. The source of the translation is
the GATT Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, as reproduced in REVIEW OF
TRADE & INVESTMENT BY MEXICO, 1990 USITC REP. 2275, at 4-13 [hereinafter
USITC REPORT].
62. Reglamento Contra Prdcticas Desleales del Comercio Internacional,
D.O., Nov. 25, 1987 [hereinafter Regulations].
63. CACCE has been translated as the Committee on Foreign Trade Tariffs
and Controls. Ernesto Rubio del Cueto, Countervailing Duties Affecting United
States-Mexican Trade, 12 Hous. J. IN'L L. 323, 325-26 (1990).
64. Act, supra note 61, ch. II, arts. 11-14.
65. Id., arts. 14-15; Regulations, supra note 62, ch. V, art. 12. "Injury" is
defined in Article 1(VIII), Chapter I of the Regulations as:
the loss or impairment of a national asset or the closure of access to
any licit, normal gain which one or several domestic producers repre-
senting a significant part of national production, suffer or may suffer
as an immediate and direct consequence of any of the unfair interna-
tional trade practices envisaged in Article 7 of the Act and in the Regu-
lations. This concept includes impediments to the establishment of
new industries or to further development of existing industries as a
direct result of unfair international practices.
Regulations, supra note 62, ch. 1, art. 1(VIII).
66. Act, supra note 61, ch. III, art. 24.
67. TRADE PoLIcY REVIEw MECHANISM: MEXICO, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFs & TRADE 102 (1993).
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the amparo procedure and remedy will be discussed in greater
detail below.68
Mexico's AD provisions have been invoked often since 1987.
Between 1987 and 1989, Mexico initiated thirty-five AD pro-
ceedings, fifteen of which were against U.S. imports.69 The ma-
jority of cases against the United States were initiated in 1987:
only two were initiated in 1988 and 1989 each, thus indicating a
decline in their initiation.70 Mexico's CVD provisions have been
invoked considerably less than AD actions, as is the case with
most nations.
B. TECHNICAL IsSUES RAISED BY INCORPORATING MEXICO INTO
A CHAPTER 19
From an organizational perspective, there were both techni-
cal and substantive concerns raised by the potential extension of
Chapter 19 to Mexico. The first technical concern was that the
FTA Chapter 19 mechanism was drafted in a bilateral context
rather than in a trilateral context. This raised the question of
whether the mechanism would be amended to reflect trinational
as opposed to binational review. Such an amendment could
have taken a number of forms. For example, one option involved
binational review by the parties directly involved in the dispute
with the third party having a right to participate in the hearing
as a litigant, but without national representation on the panel.
This option required relatively minor changes to the current
structure and functioning of the Chapter 19 mechanism. An al-
ternate option involved trinational panel review, but that option
may not have been as appealing because it effectively required
that a non-party to the dispute would be involved in the review-
ing process. This involvement could conceivably complicate
rather than facilitate the decision-making process. In the end,
binational dispute resolution was negotiated into NAFTA.
The second and third technical issues were more serious
and involved Mexico's Constitution. The second technical con-
cern raised by the potential extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico
was that Mexico's adherence to the Calvo doctrine might render
recourse to binational panels invalid under Mexican law. The
Calvo doctrine provides that where legal disputes arise between
national and foreign business partners, domestic remedies
68. See infra text accompanying notes 74-80.
69. USITC REPORT, supra note 61, at 4-17.
70. Id.
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should be used to the exclusion of international ones.7 1 Some
Latin American states, including Mexico, have adopted a provi-
sion in their constitution requiring foreigners who have been
granted certain commercial rights to abstain from seeking the
protection of their governments where a dispute concerning
those rights arises. 72 Because the binational panels provided for
in the Chapter 19 mechanism might be perceived as granting a
form of protection by a foreign government, there was a techni-
cal concern that recourse to these panels might not be valid
under Mexican law.73 Apparently, the Calvo clause in the Mexi-
can Constitution did not pose a real threat to adopting bina-
tional review under NAFTA and was effectively dealt with early
on in the Chapter 19 negotiations. However, because so many
Latin American states incorporate a form of the Calvo clause in
their constitutions, this issue could be raised in the context of
extending NAFTA throughout the Western Hemisphere.
The third technical problem raised by the potential exten-
sion of Chapter 19 to Mexico involved Mexico's writ of amparo.
The writ of amparo is a legal device which provides for a process
and remedy to redress violations of constitutionally protected in-
dividual rights by an "authority" which has caused a party in-
jury.74 Article 103 of Mexico's Constitution establishes the
71. Dr. James C. Baker & Lois J. Yoder, ICSID and the Calvo Clause a
Hindrance to Foreign Direct Investment in the LDCs, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 75, 75 (1989). Two cardinal principles constitute the core of the Calvo
Doctrine:
First, that sovereign states, being free and independent, enjoy the
right, on the basis of equality, to freedom from 'interference of any sort'
... by other states, whether it be by force or diplomacy, and second,
that aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to na-
tionals, and that therefore they may seek redress for grievances only
before the local authorities.
DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALvo CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND DwLOmAcy 19 (1955).
72. See MEx. CONST. art. 27, pt. I. Article 27 provides:
The State may grant the same right to foreigners [vis., the right to
acquire ownership of lands, waters, or to obtain concessions for the ex-
ploration of mines or waters], provided they agree before the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to consider themselves as nationals in respect to
such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of
their governments in matters relating thereto....
Id.
73. SHEA, supra note 71, at 5-6.
74. For a useful discussion of amparo, see Hector Fix Zamudo, A Brief In-
troduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CAL. W. INVL. L.J. 306 (1979).
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controversies subject to an amparo proceeding, 75 while a lengthy
Article 107 regulates its operation. 76
There appeared to be two possible implications of this device
for the incorporation of binational review into NAFTA. First,
amparo may have been used to challenge the rights of foreigners
to participate in a binational review, owing to the limits placed
on those rights under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.77
If a court were to find the law establishing binational review un-
constitutional, it could conceivably have invalidated the specific
panel decision against which the amparo process was invoked,
but not strike the law down generally.78
The second implication of amparo for binational review in-
volved recourse to amparo for violations of individual procedural
and substantive rights during the course of administrative pro-
ceedings. In the context of unfair trade remedies, amparo might
have provided recourse to Mexican importers for infringements
by SECOFI of individual rights - as established under Article
14 of the Constitution - where all other remedies have been
exhausted. 79 In such cases, administrative reviews by bina-
tional panels of SECOFI's final determinations could have been
subjected to further review by the Federal Judicial Courts,
75. Max. CONST. art. 103. Article 103 states:
The federal courts shall decide all controversies that arise:
I. Out of law or acts of the authorities that violate individual
guarantees,
II. Because of laws or acts of the federal authority restricting or
encroaching on the sovereignty of the States,
III. Because of laws or acts of State authorities that invade the
sphere of federal authority.
Id.
76. Article 107 of the Mexican Constitution provides that all controversies
mentioned in Article 103 are subject to trial in amparo and amparo can be in-
voked in criminal, administrative, civil, and labor matters. Id. art. 107.
77. See supra note 72.
78. The writ of amparo provides individual and not general relief. Article
107 of the Mexican Constitution provides:
The judgment shall always be such that it affects only private individ-
uals, being limited to affording them redress and protection in the spe-
cial case to which the complaint refers, without making any general
declaration as to the law or act on which the complaint is based.
MEX. CONST. art. 107, pt. II.
79. Id. art. 14. Article 14 states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or
rights without a trial by a duly created court in which the essential
formalities of procedure are observed and in accordance with laws is-
sued prior to the act.
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thereby resulting in panel decisions being overturned through
domestic judicial procedures.
A further concern in the NAFTA context was that recourse
by way of an amparo process appeared to be limited to those who
suffered an injury directly.8 0 In the context of trade remedy pro-
cedures, this meant effectively Mexican importers as they would
be the parties required to pay the duties imposed by SECOFI.
Thus, foreign exporters or producers could possibly be excluded
from recourse to amparo. Furthermore, the grounds for review
in an amparo action are not very transparent. This would make
it difficult for foreign nationals to understand how the mecha-
nism works and how the law is applied.
Finally, the most important concern for binational review is
that the amparo process could have undermined the finality of
panel decisions. Because the right to petition review of an ad-
ministrative decision under amparo is constitutionally en-
trenched, it would seem that a party meeting the basic
requirements necessary to invoke amparo cannot be denied that
remedy. If this is the case, then decisions by binational panels
could have been subject to review by a superior domestic court if
they were considered to be an "authority" whose decisions may
have been challenged through amparo. Consequently, one of the
primary purposes of the binational panel - to be the final arbi-
ter in an AD or CVD dispute - would have been undermined.
C. SUBSTANTrVE IssuEs RAISED BY INCORPORATING MEXICO
INTO A CHAPTER 19
The success of the FTA Chapter 19 mechanism is primarily
attributable to the fact that Canada and the United States share
similar legal traditions and unfair trade remedy systems. One
of the challenges in extending Chapter 19 to NAFTA is that the
parties do not share a common legal tradition. Mexico's legal
system is based on the civil law, whereas Canada and the
United States have systems based on the common law.
Although a general comparison between Mexican civil law and
the common law in Canada and the United States is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is sufficient for our present purposes to
suggest that the approach to the application and interpretation
80. A trial in amparo shall always be held at the instance of the injured
party. Id. art. 107, pt. I.
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of law in each of these systems is conceptually different and ulti-
mately results in a disparity between the two systems.8 1
A major concern as to whether a Chapter 19-like mecha-
nism was suitable for NAFTA involved differences between the
manner of conducting administrative proceedings in Mexico
compared to the procedure in the United States and Canada. In
the United States and Canada, it is considered extremely impor-
tant that procedural safeguards are incorporated into the struc-
ture and regulations governing the conduct of an administrative
agency in order to protect individuals from potential abuse of
state authority. A superior body's review of an administrative
body's decision to determine whether it was made in accordance
with the law can include either a finding as to whether the
agency acted outside the scope of its powers, or whether it
breached a procedural requirement, thereby affecting an indi-
vidual's right to due process or natural justice.
As indicated earlier, the essence of Chapter 19 is that it re-
quires a binational panel to assess whether an agency made its
determination in accordance with domestic law.8 2 Conse-
quently, if specific procedural safeguards governing the conduct
of an agency's investigation and duty assessments are not incor-
porated into one party's administrative system, the result is a
lower value of binational review for all parties involved in a dis-
pute. In Canada and the United States there are generally high
standards of transparency, due process and structural safe-
guards to guarantee an absence of bias in the decision-making
process. These standards are incorporated into the conduct of
administrative proceedings and ensure that decisions are made
in a quasi-judicial manner. Mexico's different standards of
transparency, due process, and structural safeguards appeared
to have serious implications for binational review.
81. For example, while law is created under the common law by judges in-
terpreting legislation in conjunction with cases establishing legal precedents,
the civil law tradition is rule based, with limited authority given to judges to
actually impose their own interpretation on the legislation. Civil law judges
look at the text of specific rules to determine whether the text applies to a spe-
cific fact situation. Under the common law, judges have the power to modify or
add to the law through the application of specific rules of interpretation. See
Fernando Orrantia, Conceptual Differences Between the Civil Law System and
the Common Law System, 19 Sw. U. L. REv. 1161, 1164-65 (1990).
82. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904.
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1. Transparency
Transparency is a key element of the law governing the con-
duct of Canadian and U.S. administrative bodies. The standard
of transparency in Canada and the United States generally re-
quires that the law applicable to an administrative agency be set
down in a clear and concise fashion and be accessible to the pub-
lic. Furthermore, the agency's conduct in performing its duties
must be evident in order that its practice can be properly re-
viewed by a superior body to determine whether the agency ful-
filled its duties in accordance with the law.8 3
These standards were not inherent aspects of Mexico's pre-
NAFTA unfair trade law administration. Mexico's system was
characterized by very general rules and regulations providing
SECOFI with broad discretionary powers to perform its duties.
SECOFI's broad powers of discretion emanated in part from the
fact that limited transparency existed in how SECOFrs investi-
gations and determinations of unfair trade practices were actu-
ally carried out. Two examples highlight the absence of
transparency and its implications for the standard of judicial re-
view under a Chapter 19-like mechanism.
First, SECOFI's time frame for conducting its investigation
and making its dumping, subsidy or injury assessments did not
reflect the time frame envisioned by the Act and Regulations.
According to the law, SECOFI was required to initiate an inves-
tigation within five days of receipt of a petition that complied
with the regulatory requirements.8 If SECOFI found sufficient
evidence to sustain an initial determination of dumping or sub-
sidization and injury, a first provisional duty could be imposed,
also within five days of receipt of the petition.85 If SECOFI
made such a determination, a second investigation would be
conducted after which a revised assessment regarding the ap-
propriate amount of the duty would be made, taking into ac-
count the results of the investigation to date, as well as
83. For example, in Canadian and U.S. AD and CVD actions, the agency is
obliged to complete an administrative record (AR) of the evidence provided by
counsel for the parties in a case. Decisions of the agency must be substantiated
by the evidence in the AR. A reviewing court (or a binational panel) will scruti-
nize the same evidence used by the agency (i.e., the AR), and if it finds that the
agency's decision cannot be substantiated by evidence, the action can be re-
manded to the agency.
84. Regulations, supra note 62, ch. VI, art. 13. SECOFI may also com-
mence an investigation at its own initiative pursuant to ch. VI, art. 15. Id.
85. Act, supra note 61, ch. II, art. 11.
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information provided by any interested parties.8 6 This second
provisional duty determination was to be made within thirty
days of the commencement of the investigation.8 7 According to
the Act, a final determination was to be made within six months
of the initial duty determination. 8
In reality, SECOFI's practice did not reflect this process.
SECOFI usually launched a formal investigation within three
months of receiving a petition, and required at least a week
(although it could take as long as a month) before a first provi-
sional assessment was made.8 9 The extension of deadlines was
widespread throughout Mexico's unfair trade law administra-
tion. Consequently, although SECOFI was required to complete
its investigation within six months, it usually took between fif-
teen and eighteen months for completion once the proceedings
were initiated, or eighteen to twenty-one months from the filing
date.90
A second problem with transparency in Mexico's trade ad-
ministration related to the compilation of the administrative
record. Because there were no explicit provisions in the Regula-
tions outlining what should constitute the administrative rec-
ord, SECOFI could effectively determine what should or should
not be included in the written record. This use of discretion
meant that the compiled record would often be inadequate for
the purposes of judicial review under a Chapter 19-like mecha-
nism. A detailed record of an agency's actions is central to a
review process. Without a proper record, a binational panel can-
not effectively review an agency's practices and determine
whether the challenged order was dealt with properly at the
lower stages of the investigation or in the assessment of the
amount of the duty.
The absence of a sufficient degree of transparency in an
agency's governing legislation and practice might adversely af-
fect a party's interests. Uncertainty as to the time-frame for
SECOFI's investigations and duty assessments might also im-
pair the ability of parties to prepare properly for participation in
86. Id. ch. II, art. 12.
87. Id.
88. Id. art. 13.
89. USITC REPORT, supra note 61, at 4-13, 4-14.
90. Id. Regarding time frame, it appears that SECOFI's actual practice is
more liberal than its written regulations. However, SECOFI's practice disad-
vantaged exporters by creating legal uncertainty about deadlines and, where
procedures drag on extensively, by requiring exporters to pay duties while mak-
ing a final determination.
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the investigative and assessment process, as well as for payment
of the duty. Moreover, parties might be unable to criticize an
agency for unfair treatment where the agency appears to have
acted within its broad discretionary powers. This problem could
be compounded by the fact that an absence of clear guidelines
governing the compilation of the administrative record means
that a superior body could not fully know how an agency per-
formed its duties. Therefore, it could not assess properly
whether an agency's actions met certain procedural standards
intended to protect individuals from an abuse of agency power.
2. Due Process
SECOFI's non-adherence to the deadlines as envisioned by
the Regulations raised another major concern about the exten-
sion of Chapter 19 in terms of the standard of due process in
Mexico's unfair trade law administration. Due process requires
that individuals whose interests are affected by an administra-
tive action are given adequate notice of the action and a suffi-
cient opportunity to respond to it. However, under the terms of
Chapter 19, Mexico's practice was problematic in two respects.
First, binational panels must apply written law, and Mexico's
law was inconsistent with that of Canada and the United States.
Second, the discrepancy between Mexico's written law and prac-
tice created a perception of arbitrary procedures.
In the United States, the analogous remedy to the imposi-
tion of a first provisional duty under Mexico's Regulations re-
quires the posting of a cash bond, deposit or other form of
security for the importation of each allegedly subsidized or
dumped product once an affirmative preliminary determination
has been made.9 1 Given the time frames for making a prelimi-
nary determination, such security would only be required at
least eighty-five days after the filing of a CVD petition or 160
days in the case of an AD petition. Canada usually makes its
preliminary determinations within ninety days, at which time it
may impose provisional duties or cause security to be posted by
the importer. 92 Both of these situations allow the affected in-
dustry to participate to some extent in the investigation and as-
sessment of the provisional duty.
A clear example of the lower standard of due process in
Mexico's system is reflected by the time frame established in the
91. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(d)(2), 1673b(d)(2) (1988).
92. Special Imports Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985), amended by
S.C., ch. 65, § 26(1) (1988) (Can.).
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Act and the Regulations for SECOFI to conduct its investiga-
tions and make its determinations. As stated earlier, SECOFI
was required to initiate an investigation within five days of re-
ceiving a petition in compliance with regulatory requirements. 93
Yet, the Act also contemplated the application of a first provi-
sional duty within five days of the initiation of the investiga-
tion.94 SECOFI was required to notify the complainant and
respondent of its decision to initiate an investigation 95 and also
to publish its first provisional duty determination in the Diario
Oficial.96 The legislation, moreover, contemplated simultaneous
notice of the initiation of the investigation and the imposition of
a provisional duty.97 Given the timeframes and the notice re-
quirements, a Mexican importer or a foreign exporter could have
been left unaware of the initiation of an investigation until the
first provisional duty was imposed.9s Consequently, an im-
porter could have been required by law to pay a duty without
having any opportunity to participate in the assessment of the
first provisional duty. Moreover, SECOFI calculated the appro-
priate amount of the first provisional duty on information ob-
tained from international data banks and not on data from
either importers or producers of the goods at issue.99 Thus, the
dumping margin or subsidy calculation was also not very
accurate.
Another issue of due process which could have threatened
the viability of the Chapter 19 mechanism in NAFTA was that
under the Act only importers had standing to appeal an affirma-
tive finding of an unfair trade practice. 100 Thus, Canadian and
U.S. exporters were unable to appeal decisions by SECOFI and,
therefore, would have been unable to request binational review
under a Chapter 19 mechanism.
3. Structural Safeguards
Another element important to the common law notion of ef-
fective judicial review is the requirement that administrative
agencies act independently or semi-independently of the govern-
93. See supra note 84.
94. Act, supra note 61, art. 11.
95. Regulations, supra note 62, ch. VI, art. 13.
96. Id. ch. VI, art. 18. The Diario Oficial is Mexico's equivalent to the Can-
ada Gazette and the Federal Register in the United States.
97. Id. ch. VI, art. 16.
98. USITC REPORT, supra note 61, at 4-13, 4-14.
99. Id. at 4-14.
100. Act, supra note 61, ch. III, art. 24.
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ment. In the case of AD and CVD determinations, this indepen-
dence is necessary in order to de-politicize the process and to
ensure greater objectivity in agencies' decisions. In addition, it
is considered important that dumping and subsidy assessments
and injury determinations be made by two different agencies in
order to prevent potential bias in the final decision.
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the Ca-
nadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) are independent
bodies responsible for material injury determinations. 10 1 More-
over, their final determinations are made independently of the
dumping or subsidy findings by the International Trade Admin-
istration (ITA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the
Assessment Programs Division of Revenue Canada (RC). The
roles of the CITT, ITC and ITA are both investigative and adju-
dicative. Although the ITA is a branch of the DOC, it acts in a
quasi-judicial manner independent of the DOC. Revenue Can-
ada's situation is somewhat different. It does not technically
conform to the requirement of semi-independence, because it is
more closely connected with the federal revenue department, a
fact that has been criticized by the United States. However, its
determinations are subject to judicial review similar to injury
findings of the CITT and are, therefore, acceptable. In spite of
RC's unique situation, the independence or semi-independence
of the agencies responsible for dumping and subsidy determina-
tions is still considered an important quality for effective judicial
review.
As indicated above, dumping and subsidy determinations as
well as injury findings were made in Mexico by SECOFI, which
is effectively a branch of the Mexican Department of Commerce.
The determinations were influenced by the Comisi6n de
Aranceles y Controles al Comercio Exterior (CACCE), 10 2 an in-
teragency working group consisting of officials from SECOFI
and other executive agencies. The CACCE advised SECOFI on
the level of duty to be applied as well as the content of SECOFI's
final determination regarding the investigated merchandise.
Consequently, SECOFI's determinations were made neither in-
dependently nor semi-independently from the government.
Moreover, dumping and subsidy determinations were not neces-
sarily made independently of injury assessments. Given these
101. In Canada, preliminary injury determinations are in fact made by Rev-
enue Canada, whereas in the United States, both the preliminary and final in-
jury determinations are made by the ITC.
102. See supra note 63.
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facts, there was a concern that SECOFI's findings on injury
might be either politically influenced or substantially affected by
its findings in a dumping or subsidy investigation. However,
there appears to be no express provision in NAFTA Annex
1904.15 requiring Mexico to adopt a structure similar to that of
Canada and the United States.
4. Trade Law Administration
In addition to the factors discussed above, there were spe-
cific elements of Mexico's unfair trade law administration that
were less favorable to affected parties than the equivalent Cana-
dian and U.S. provisions. In Mexico, the proceedings culminat-
ing in a final determination were in practice considerably longer
than in Canada and the United States. In the United States, a
final determination must be made between 205 and 300 days
after a countervailing duty petition is filed, or between 280 and
420 days after the filing of an antidumping petition.10 3 In Can-
ada, the CITT must make its final determination within 120
days after receiving notice of the preliminary determination
from Revenue Canada. 10 4 As indicated earlier, in Mexico, the
complete process, culminating in a final determination, usually
took from eighteen to twenty-one months from the date the peti-
tion was filed. 10 5 The length of the proceedings had an impact
on interested parties in Mexico in part because once a prelimi-
nary dumping or subsidy determination was made and a provi-
sional duty was imposed, the affected importers had to pay the
duty until it was either finalized or revoked. This would have
been costly and detrimental to both importers and foreign ex-
porters, especially where the preliminary finding was found to
be unsubstantiated in subsequent investigations.
D. SuMMARY
Without transparency in laws and proceedings, high stan-
dards of due process, and the independence or semi-indepen-
dence of administrative bodies, judicial review is hollow and
ineffective. SECOFI's broad discretionary powers which re-
sulted from the lack of transparency in Mexico's unfair trade law
administration created the potential for interested parties and
103. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d, 1673b, 1673d (1988). See USITC REPORT,
supra note 61, at 4-16.
104. Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. S-15 (1985), amended by S.C.,
ch. 65, § 43(1) (1988) (Can.).
105. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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the government to influence SECOFrs deadlines and duty as-
sessments. Without the incorporation of higher standards into
the conduct of Mexico's trade law administration, a Chapter 19
dispute settlement mechanism in NAFTA would not have been
suitable.
The differences between Mexico's unfair trade system and
that of Canada and the United States were not ultimately a bar-
rier to extending Chapter 19 to NAFTA. However, the lack of
experience of Mexican and American/Canadian lawyers and ad-
ministrators with each other's legal system will doubtless gener-
ate some problems of adaptation in the early Chapter 19 panels
involving effectiveness of the panel process in Mexico. 106 No for-
mal transitional period was incorporated into the NAFTA Chap-
ter 19 to ensure that lawyers and officials familiarize
themselves with foreign procedures of judicial review, nor was
there any similar transition period in the Canada-U.S. FTA. It
appears likely that some time will pass before Mexican jurists,
in particular, will have an opportunity to fully incorporate the
changes to Mexico's unfair trade remedy rules and administra-
tion required under NAFTA.
IV. INCORPORATING THE CHAPTER 19 MECHANISM
INTO NAFTA
As discussed above, Mexico's pre-NAFTA AD and CVD sys-
tem differed substantially from that of Canada and the United
States. Yet, the underlying compatibility of Canadian and
American legislation and administrative practices was the basis
for negotiating a binational dispute settlement mechanism into
the FTA. In negotiating a similar mechanism in NAFTA, some
basic accommodation on the part of Mexico was clearly required
in order to maintain the standards of judicial review and due
process inherent in the FTA mechanism. This same choice will
face other parties seeking to accede to NAFTA.
In light of this situation, some important changes in Chap-
ter 19 were required to ensure that Mexico's trade remedy sys-
tem was sufficiently similar to that of Canada and the United
States. Where this was not possible, or where (as in the case of
amparo) the operation of the Mexican legal system appeared un-
certain to Mexico's trading partners, it was important to ensure
that adequate remedial provisions were incorporated into the
106. Peter Morici, Trade Talks with Mexico: A Time for Realism 38 (April
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade) (forthcoming 1994).
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Agreement to protect the other parties. The rationale underlying
these changes is that Chapter 19 presupposes that a binational
panel will apply the domestic law of the party whose agency's
determination is being challenged. Where a party's administra-
tive procedures, statutes, or standard of judicial review do not
match, or at least come close to, those found in the other parties'
unfair trade remedy systems, interested nationals of those other
parties may not receive a standard of due process equivalent to
that extended by their governments to foreign exporters.
There were three important changes negotiated to Chapter
19 to allow Mexico, Canada and the United States to reach
agreement in NAFTA. First, the parties included in NAFTA a
section outlining desirable qualities for the administration of an-
tidumping and countervailing duty laws. 107 Second, the parties
included a section that outlines a series of twenty obligatory
amendments to Mexico's unfair trade remedy regime which
would make the Mexican system more compatible with that of
Canada and the United States.108 The proposed amendments
are mainly procedural, and are intended to address the low stan-
dards of due process that are characteristic of Mexico's unfair
trade remedy legislation. 10 9 For example, there are require-
ments that Mexican legislation shall provide explicit timetables
for administrative proceedings, full participation in the adminis-
trative process for interested parties, and timely access to all
non-confidential information. 110 Mexico must change its law
that allows for the imposition of duties only five days after re-
ceipt of a petition. In addition, Mexico must expand its recogni-
tion of parties having standing to request judicial review to
include foreign producers and exporters who were formerly ex-
cluded from seeking such review of an agency's determination.
Perhaps most importantly, Mexico is required to compile a com-
prehensive administrative record of the proceedings of the inves-
tigating agency and a detailed statement of legal reasoning
underlying the agency determination. This record and state-
107. For example, "publish notice of initiation of investigations," and "pro-
vide disclosure of relevant information... [including]... an explanation of the
calculation or the methodology used to determine the margin of dumping or the
amount of subsidy," and so forth. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1907(3).
108. Id. Annex 1904.15(d), pt. B.
109. It should be recalled that the provision of due process in unfair trade
remedy practice is a relatively recent phenomenon in Canada and the United
States. Furthermore, it is probable that Mexico provided greater due process in
practice than required by Mexican law.
110. NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex 1904.15(d), pt. B.
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ment would then become the basis for judicial review by a bina-
tional panel.
Third, under the title of "Safeguarding the Panel Review
System," the parties included a section in NAFTA which pro-
vides remedies if a party does not comply with its obligations
under Chapter 19.111 Specifically, if the application of a party's
domestic law prevents a binational panel from carrying out its
functions, NAFTA provides recourse to consultation and then to
a Special Committee of three individuals selected from the same
roster used for the purpose of establishing Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Committees. 1 2 If the Committee finds that a party has
not complied with Chapter 19, then the complaining party can
suspend binational panel review or equivalent "appropriate"
benefits with respect to that party. 113 Article 1905 further pro-
vides that binational panel reviews between the disputing Par-
ties will be stayed,"14 and will revert to domestic courts if
necessary;"15 and gives the party complained against rights to
retaliate in kind to a suspension of binational panel review by
the complaining party.1 6 In the event the party initially com-
plained against removes the cause for complaint, provision is
made to reconvene a Special Committee to assess the situation
and then terminate counter-measures, if appropriate. 117
Given the successful history of Chapter 19 in the FTA, it is
unlikely that a Special Committee would arise between Canada
and the United States, but it may form a useful sanction to en-
sure that Mexico (or any other country acceding to NAFTA)
adopts the domestic practices necessary to implement Chapter
19. However, it is unlikely that the extension of Chapter 19 to
Mexico could survive any substantial use of Article 1905, since
such use would essentially signal a breakdown of the undertak-
ings of Chapter 19 itself.
111. Id. art. 1905.
112. Id. Extraordinary Challenge Committees were provided for in the FTA
to permit a party to challenge a binational panel decision on grounds, inter alia,
of misconduct or abuse of power. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(13). NAFTA has
a similar provision. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1904(13).
113. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1905(8).
114. Id. art. 1905(11).
115. Id. art. 1905(12).
116. Id. art. 1905(9).
117. Id. art. 1905(10).
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V. CONCLUSION
The similarities in how Canada and Mexico approached AD
and CVDs in a regional trade agreement may provide clues as to
how this issue might play out in a broader context, such as a
hemispheric or multilateral trade agreement. First, both Can-
ada and Mexico recognized that resort to unfair trade remedies
by the larger trade partner - the United States - could
threaten security of access to the U.S. market, and therefore un-
dercut the value of a trade agreement. Second, both Canada and
Mexico sought an exception from U.S. unfair trade legislation,
and failed. Third, both Canada and Mexico tried to negotiate a
broader understanding over the use of AD and CVDs, but also
failed.118 Finally, both countries settled on a binding dispute
settlement mechanism, built around an internationalized form
of judicial review of domestic agency actions, as a surrogate for a
more permanent solution to the problem of AD and CVDs be-
tween close trading partners.
If other hemispheric nations were to accede to NAFTA or
negotiate a new hemispheric trade agreement, it is likely that a
Chapter 19-like mechanism would appeal to them for the same
reason it appealed to Canada or Mexico. Trade remedy actions
like AD and CVDs arguably amount to increased protectionism,
and they are on the increase in international trade. It is in the
interest of most nations to have AD and CVD actions conform to
high standards of due process, even more so if the substance of
these actions may have a harmful impact on international trade
relations. Given the widespread use of AD and CVDs, in partic-
ular by the United States, and the difficulties in establishing
standardized substantive rules in this area, it seems probable
that other countries will consider negotiating a Chapter 19-like
mechanism.
The Canada-U.S. FTA negotiation demonstrated that it is
easier to adopt a Chapter 19 mechanism for AD and CVDs
where legal systems are similar, while the NAFTA negotiation
illustrated how accommodation can be made where systems are
different. Any attempt by hemispheric nations to accede to
NAFTA would raise some of the same issues faced in the
NAFTA Chapter 19 negotiation, such as the role of amparo
(which has been widely adopted in South America from the Mex-
118. In the case of AD duties, such an understanding might be the use of
national competition policy as an alternative to AD actions. For CVDs, the Sub-
sidies Code in the Uruguay Round will likely improve the legal framework con-
cerning subsidies and CVDs in regional trade agreements.
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ican legal system), as well as the nature and procedural stan-
dards of AD and CVD investigations and their consequent
impact on the standards of judicial review and due process
under a Chapter 19-like mechanism. Given the Mexican exam-
ple, it seems likely that sufficient accommodation could be made
for other countries to accede to a Chapter 19 mechanism, espe-
cially if new accessions were negotiated on a serial basis.
Owing to the greater diversity of legal systems and the
greater complication of negotiating detailed matters of adminis-
trative law on a multilateral basis, it is less likely that a Chap-
ter 19 mechanism would be amenable to multilateral
negotiation in the GATT. However, the pressures to establish
due process in trade remedy practices are undeniable. The con-
ditions for the rise of Chapter 19 initially in Canadian-U.S. rela-
tions, which then extended to Mexico, were an increase in
domestic trade regulatory actions coupled with an increase in
international economic interdependence. These conditions are
not abating in the international system. To the extent that for-
eigners can be affected by the domestic administrative regula-
tions of their neighbors, it is possible that they will seek forums
like Chapter 19 which are intended to ensure as much as possi-
ble that their due process rights will be protected.
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